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PL-BZ-3213
Copy No. 13 of 21

Memorandum 6L-262

Page 1 of 3

Division 6 - Lincoln Laboratory

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Lexington 73, Massachusetts

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED TO: Add 00254 FU KRE 3-15-60

Subject: Group Leaders' Meeting - May 28, 1956

To:

Group Leaders and Associate Group Leaders

From: C. W. Farr

May 31, 1956 Date:

Present: J. W. Forrester, R. R. Everett, J. A. Arnow,

C. L. Corderman, S. H. Dodd, C. W. Farr,
D. R. Israel, J. F. Jacobs, K. E. McVicar,
B. E. Morriss, Jr., J. A. O'Brien, J. C. Proctor,
E. S. Rich, P. Youtz, C. A. Zraket, and part time
D. R. Brown, N. H. Taylor

Agenda: 1. Programming Schedules

2. 48 Hour Week

3. Relation with Contractor Personnel

4. XD-1 Maintenance

5. BTL

1. Programming Schedules

Jacobs reviewed the programming schedule situation stating that the first program for ESS would be completed in March 1957 and that the Air Surveillance pontion would be ready previously, (possibly December 1956). He said Col. Lee had been advised, also Col. LaMontagne and Col. Christian of ATC. Information must be given promptly to ADES (Halligan has already been unofficially informed; he proposes a review in mid-June of the complete SAGE implementation schedule). McGuire operational date has slipped approximately one year; this programming schedule slippage would be much more serious if the integration and systems test tasks did not also show signs of requiring much more time than originally estimated by those responsible for performing them. Lincoln will proceed this week to prepare a formal statement concerning our present schedule for completing the elements of the programming task. Dodd, Jacobs, Melahn and Col. Lee

CONFIDENTIA

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. CASE 06-1104.

CONFIDENTIAL DESIFIED

Memorandum 6L-262

are meeting May 28, to study the schedule; Jacobs is calling a meeting of the Group Leaders concerned May 29.

Rich inquired concerning action to be taken in preparing an ESS schedule for ADES, due June 5. Discussion resulted in decision to prepare as much as possible of the schedule and to cover the remaining items with a notation explaining the current programming scheduling situation.

Dodd inquired concerning possibility of bolstering the Direction Center programming effort by diverting manpower from the Command Center effort; Jacobs stated that this has already been done.

McVicar inquired the effect of schedule slippage on subsectors after McGuire; Israel forecasted that April or May 1957, would see completion of a coded program for Stewart, with parameter checkout and assembly checkout as far as possible under off-site conditions.

2. 48 Hour Week

Israel said that Group 61 had been working an extended (6 day) week for six weeks and has found the sixth day more productive than any other day in the week; Group 61 wants to continue through June. Arnow said Group 67 has been told that the extended work week will not be continued through both July and August; the extended work week in Group 67 would be for a few sections, not the entire group; Group 67 prefers an extra hour each day and Saturday morning work rather than a full day on Saturday.

Forrester suggested, in view of the programming schedule adjustment which indicates a continuing heavy load work extending a year ahead rather than just a few months, that the 48 hour work week be abandoned during July and August and picked up again in September. Everett agreed suggesting normal scheduling of vacations and a 5 day work week during July and August.

Israel assented stating that the extended work week would be continued through June.

Israel announced that it is RAND policy to pay at the time-and-a-half rate for overtime hours worked by employees whose base rate is less than \$577 per month.

3. Relation with Contractor Personnel

Arnow requested advice concerning a Western Electric employee assigned to Group 67 who is discontented working for WE. WE recently explained to the employee that his work was substandard and did not warrant a salary increase. Arnow is satisfied with his work and feels that he would be a desirable recruit for Lincoln or RAND. Arnow had just learned of the situation and did not have the history of the man.

CONFIDENTIAL

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. CASE 06-1104.

CONFIDENTIAL

Memorandum 6L-262

Forrester suggested that Everett or Jacobs discuss the policy question with Schwartz or Wilkes.

4. XD-l Maintenance

O'Brien asked for advice in remedying maintenance problems on XD-I; he referred to Taylor's Seminar remarks comparing XD-I performance with WW-I and said that XD-I is not going to come up to WW-I standards without a major change in IBM approach to the problem. In comparison with other equipment IBM feels that XD-I performance is excellent; apparently Mills had not realized until recently the wide gap between XD-I performance and WW-I performance.

Discussion indicated that the basic differences lies in IBM's principal aim, to get XD-l back on the air as soon as possible after each failure, vs. M. I. T. 's principal aim to find the answer to every failure on WW-I.

Taylor suggested that we should ask IBM for specific reports on marginal checking, pluggable unit failure etc. Forrester suggested that the story be carefully prepared for the coordination meeting.

O'Brien has placed Daggett on full time assignment to follow KD-1 maintenance problems, with promise of further help if needed.

Taylor also suggested more complete Lincoln monitoring of XD-1 and full time Lincoln coverage of at least one man.

O'Brien said that requests for better marginal checking had been used by IBM as an excuse to request more XD-1 time for maintenance program debugging; O'Brien feels that IBM could do this in the 7 hours per day and 24 hours Sunday now available to them.

In conclusion it was pointed out that these problems rest with O'Brien.

5. BTL

Morriss stated Burger had announced plans to leave Lincoln June 15, to work on the ICBM problem at BTL. Morriss and Burger reached agreement concerning detailed handling of requests for certain test equipment.

CWF:ssm

C. W. Farr, Secretary

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